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Abstract - The emergence of high-speed networks, 
Grid Computing, Service-Oriented Architectures, and 
an ever increasing ambient connection to mobile 
Internet has enabled an underpinning infrastructure for 
the development of dynamically formed, collaborative 
working groups known as Virtual Organisations (VOs). 
VOs provide strong motivation for investigation into 
the infrastructure, and in particular the security 
necessary to protect the information and resources 
shared within a VO, both while resident on local 
machines and when allowed to move beyond the 
secure boundary of a local organisational network 
perimeter and into the realm of the distributed VO. 
Traditional access control systems are perimeter-
centric, meaning they apply the controls to both 
internal and external requests for access to information 
within or at the perimeter of their information system. 
This paper presents the initial results of the JISC 
funded SPIDER project, being led by Cardiff 
University. Through case based example, the research 
investigates the limitations to granularity and persistent 
control over information when using the perimeter-
centric approach in a collaborative working 
environment. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Collaborative working between multiple organisations 
will always require some level of information sharing 
and exchange. A significant amount of information 
belonging to an organisation will have an associated 
value for which appropriate protection mechanisms 
must be put in place in order to prevent the exposure or 
loss of that information. The emergence of Grid 
computing and Service-Oriented Architectures have 
led to the increasing adoption of dynamically formed, 
collaborative working groups known as Virtual 
Organisations (VOs). These Virtual Organisations 
(VOs), as defined in [1] and [2], provide strong 
motivation for investigation into the infrastructure, and 
in particular the security necessary to protect the 
information and resources shared within a VO, both 
while resident on local machines and when allowed to 
move beyond the secure boundary of a local 
organisational network perimeter and into the realm of 
the distributed VO.  
Much of the previous research in the area of 
access control approaches to shared information to date 
such as VOMS [3], PERMIS [4], ShARPE [5] and 
iRODS [6] has focused on the protection of 
information resources as an entity within the secure 
network boundary, for example, an entire classified 
document; access is either granted or denied using 
system-level access controls, or Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) [7] techniques on the entity. This 
approach often has two major drawbacks: 
• It hinders information sharing to some extent due 
to its limited granularity. That is, information 
sharing, and as a result collaborative working, is 
not being allowed to reach its maximum potential 
because large amounts of information cannot be 
shared due to small amounts of higher-level 
sensitive content within the resource raising the 
overall classification of the resource. 
• With current DRM and system-level controls that 
can control access to information to some extent 
after the information has been allowed to move 
beyond an organisation’s access control perimeter, 
the access control policy is permanent and cannot 
be modified by the owner of the information. 
However, there may be a change in the controls 
required to protect a resource. For example, the 
VO working group may disperse or the VO 
community may be changed, thus wishing to deny 
access to information previously shared.  
The JISC funded SPIDER project at Cardiff 
University aims to address both drawbacks. Firstly by 
investigating and modifying approaches to access 
control which remove the fixed boundaries around the 
whole information resource, and place boundaries just 
around the sensitive content within the resource. 
Thereby putting part of the access control policy within 
the information itself, and allowing the access 
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restrictions to apply to not only the entire resource but 
also the content within. This has the potential to allow 
the sensitive content to be strictly controlled, while the 
rest of the information in the resource can be made 
publicly available. Different views of a resource can be 
created for varying levels of access control.  
Secondly by adapting the access control 
techniques to include modifiable access control policy, 
even on resources that have been stored on media 
outside the control of the system access control 
perimeter. The proposed work will review and build on 
current and emerging standards/approaches to 
Information Security that define policy and place 
access control restriction criteria with the information 
resource itself, instead of the common approach which 
relies on centrally controlled access to information 
contained within a finite perimeter (e.g. a company 
network).  
Collaborative working arrangements can have a 
limited and dynamic lifespan. Following the end of 
collaboration or change in organisational structure, 
there may be a requirement to discontinue the sharing 
of information. In fact, sometimes it may be necessary 
to terminate the sharing arrangement immediately, 
should a loss of trust or irreparable loss of working 
relationship occur. In this case, the access control 
policy used to restrict access and use of the information 
would ideally be modifiable in order to restrict or 
remove previously assigned access and usage rights. 
Using a risk assessment of information sharing in 
the UK Probation Service as a case study, this paper 
presents a model intended to reconfigure and extend 
current access control techniques and technologies: to 
allow the ability to enforce restrictions outside of an 
organisational information system boundary; to drill 
down into the data level of an information resource in 
order to apply varying levels of protection to different 
sections of content within a resource; and finally to 
enable the modification of access control policy on 
previously shared, distributed information. The 
following sections detail current approaches to 
controlling access and use of information and suggest 
how these approaches could be modified to better suit 
collaborative working across distributed, autonomously 
controlled information systems. At present the work is 
focussed on the temporal, task-specific structure of VO 
activity so it should be noted that the information being 
shared is of a particularly sensitive nature and that 
there may be additional contractual agreements that 
need to be enforced within the solution. 
 
2. Background 
 
The development of a collaborative electronic 
working infrastructure provides the potential for a 
more effective and productive working relationship 
between inter-organisational, cross discipline 
organisations working on distributed information 
systems. The United Kingdom criminal justice system 
is a prime example for such activity when considering 
the interdisciplinary organisations working towards the 
same goal. As part of the SPIDER project, the project 
team have conducted a risk assessment of the 
information sharing system within the prosecution 
service for youth offenders. Information is shared 
between the Courts, the Police, Youth Offender 
Services and the Parents of the Youth among others. 
There is a requirement to share information unique to 
each case such as the details of the offence, the charges 
being brought, the resulting criminal record, and the 
identity details of the youth in question. While the 
information is required to be shared between 
organisations in support of the collaborative system, it 
is also clear from the risk assessment that information 
is at risk of disclosure, loss, corruption and interception 
during operational activities. It is incredibly important 
that sensitive content within the shared information is 
classified according to the requirements for its 
protection, ensuring that only the relevant people gain 
access to sensitive information. It is equally as relevant 
that each organisation maintains control of the 
information that they are responsible for, in order to 
reduce the risk to information shared in such a way. 
This presents some key requirements:  
i. An information classification scheme that is able to 
accurately define the requirements necessary to 
protect shared information. 
ii. An access control model that is enforceable by all 
collaborating parties, taking into account the 
possibility that information may not remain local to 
their own information systems and the controls may 
need to be applied to information that has been 
distributed to collaborating partner’s information 
systems. 
iii. A fine-grained approach to applying controls within 
an access control model. Several organisations may 
be responsible for different sections of content in a 
collaboratively developed resource. If they 
contribute some content to a resource, a criminal 
case report for a youth offender for example, they 
should be able to define their own protection 
requirements for that content. Providing controls to 
the entire resource with a single classification may 
not be acceptable as each organisation may have a 
different view on the protection requirements for 
their information and the content within the 
resource may vary in classification. Certain 
sections of content may be classified higher than 
others and require a greater level restriction. In 
some cases information may also be protected by 
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the Data Protection Act, in which case the 
contributing organisation is legally obliged to 
protect that information. The definition and 
application of controls should be able to reflect 
that. 
iv. As collaborative relationships develop and disband, 
access control privileges for collaborating partners 
may need to be modified to add, modify or revoke 
access privileges. The privileges defined in an 
access control policy for a resource should be 
modifiable and should take effect immediately if a 
change in privileges occurs. This applies to 
distributed information and information shared in 
resources held by multiple collaborating parties.  
These requirements provide the motivation for the 
following adaptation of current access control models 
and techniques to allow more flexible, persistent and 
accurate protection for information shared in 
collaborative working environments. 
 
3. Existing Access Control Techniques 
 
Traditional access control systems such as PERMIS 
and VOMS are perimeter-centric, meaning they apply 
the controls to both internal and external requests for 
access to information within or at the perimeter of their 
information system. There are several issues that arise 
from the application of perimeter-centric access control 
to distributed, collaborative information sharing within 
VOs. Primarily, the use of perimeter-centric security 
limits the persistent control available after information 
has been distributed between collaborators. Once the 
information has been shared, i.e. copied, transferred 
and stored on another organisation’s information 
system, it can no longer be protected by the same 
mechanisms as it is no longer stored within the 
perimeter. One approach to solving this issue would be 
to provide an access control technique that could 
continue to be applied to information after it had been 
copied, transferred and stored on another 
organisations’ information system. Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) is an emerging technology that 
aims to provide the remote enforcement of access 
control policy through the use of proprietary software 
that controls the access and usage of distributed 
resources. While this goes some way to a de-
perimeterised security model, the controls defined are 
static and can only currently be applied at the ‘entire-
resource’ level. This highlights the problems of a lack 
of persistent control and limited granularity. 
Information resources are often a collection of related 
pieces of information with varying levels of protection 
requirements. Certain parts of the document may be 
restricted to use within the organisation, while other 
parts may be non-sensitive content that could be shared 
with other organisations. It may not be trivial to 
remove the restricted content before sharing as it may 
be mixed into paragraphs with the non-sensitive 
content. As such, the restricted content within a 
document often means the entire document is not 
shared, limiting the effectiveness, dynamism, and 
potential of collaborative working.  
There have been efforts in recent years to break 
down the content of information resources and apply 
different controls to content with specific protection 
requirements [8][9]. These approaches rely on the 
resource being structured so that the content can be 
fragmented and tagged according to their protection 
requirements, and the application of encryption 
techniques and fine-grained key management to 
provide access control for the resource. Effectively, 
fragmented content with specific access control 
requirements are encrypted with a different key to 
other sections of content within the resource, meaning 
that keys can be assigned to different users so that they 
can only decrypt the content that they have privileges 
to access.  This approach has some major drawbacks 
with a view to maintaining persistent, modifiable 
access controls for the information. Key management 
is an incredibly complex task. Issuing keys to a static 
set of users is hard to manage; issuing them to a 
dynamic set of users in a collaborative working group 
is even harder – particularly when the key issuers will 
be the collaborators themselves and not a single 
authority. From a scalability viewpoint, the more 
collaborators you have contributing to distributed 
information resources between a dynamic set of users, 
key management becomes incrementally more 
difficult. Furthermore, once the keys are issued, there 
is no way of revoking them. Once a user has an 
information resource in their possession and is able to 
access it using the keys issued to them, the access 
control policy cannot be modified and enforced. The 
same drawback occurs with DRM. This means 
previously assigned access privileges cannot be 
modified at the end of a collaboration agreement, 
something that could be very advantageous show due 
diligence that all electronic access has been revoked. If 
this can be achieved, it becomes more likely that future 
use of the information can be proven to show intent of 
use outside of the collaborative agreement. 
An approach to fragmenting and tagging 
information content according to its access and usage 
restrictions is also published by the Creative Commons 
community [10]. Rather than a technical set of access 
controls, Creative Commons identifies a set of 
licensing properties that inform the reader of 
information resources of their obligations and 
limitations when sharing and reusing the information 
contained within the resource, through the use of the 
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Creative Commons Rights Expression Language 
(ccREL) to express machine readable copyright 
licensing terms and related information. The approach 
follows a similar line of investigation to [8] and [9] by 
tagging sections of structured content with labels that 
represent different levels of access and usage 
restriction. However, within the information resource 
there is an embedded URL link to the full licence for 
the content. The document at this location details how 
the labels should be interpreted by the reader. This is a 
live URL and, of course, can be updated and modified 
at any time by creator of the licence. In addition to this, 
a completely new licence could be created for the 
resource, in which case the existing link will forward 
the reader to the latest version. The access control 
model suggested in this paper considers the possibility 
of modifying the existing models of fragmenting 
structured content based on access control 
requirements, together with a live URL link to an 
access control policy that can be enforced through a 
DRM style application at each client location in a 
collaborative working environment. 
 
4. A De-Perimeterised Approach to 
Access Control 
 
The approach developed as part of the SPIDER 
project aims to provide persistent and accurate access 
control for information, specifically text documents, 
shared in collaborative working environments.  
The proposed solution comprises three 
components: an information classification scheme that 
represents the protection requirements available for 
information shared in collaborative working 
environments; a fine-grained approach to access 
control policy definition that allows information 
resource owners to fragment and classify their 
information resources, map the classifications onto the 
information content, and provide a live URL link to the 
access control policy for the resource; and a 
proprietary Open Source Java-based tool that can be 
installed on stand-alone machines or invoked via Web 
Start [11] both to define and enforce the access control 
policy. 
The resources being used to demonstrate the 
SPIDER application are proprietary Microsoft Office 
Word 2003 and 2007 text documents that have been 
translated through a set of filters to become plain-text, 
structured XML documents. This process allows the 
documents to be manipulated using standard XML 
functionality and can be automated either locally or 
through a Web Service invocation of the Open Source 
Docvert Tool [12]. 
 
4.1 Information Classification Scheme 
 
The purpose of the information classification 
scheme is to give information resource owners a set of 
protection options that can be used to represent the 
control requirements for their information. SPIDER 
has produced a set of initial controls which aim to 
represent controls applicable to information shared in 
collaborative working environments. These are: 
• Community Access 
• Restricted Access 
• Personal Information 
• Organisation Only 
These labels allow an access control policy to be 
derived which can define user access privileges by 
mapping their identity to Boolean values for each label. 
The SPIDER application allows sections of content to 
be highlighted and by clicking an icon that represents 
the classification label; the user can select the controls 
applicable to that section of content. The application 
then transparently embeds the label into the body of the 
information content, nesting the content within the 
selected label. An example of the structure of a 
resource relating to the prosecution case against a 
youth offender is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Document Structure and Labelling 
 
The vision for the SPIDER application is to act as 
a plug-in to existing access control techniques and be 
used across multiple information domains. As such, the 
Information Classification Scheme can be modified 
and contain different labels to suit the information 
protection requirements of information from specific 
domains such as healthcare, legal and academic 
research. The method provided within the application 
for selecting classification labels, mapping them to the 
information content, and defining access control policy 
 
<Personal Information> 
Identity Details 
< / Personal Information > 
 
<Restricted Access> 
Offence Details 
< / Restricted Access > 
 
<Community Access>  
Probation Report 
< / Community Access > 
ResourceID - CU01436847 
Policy – 
http://spider.wesc.ac.uk/SPIDER 
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for the labels is flexible enough to support other 
Information Classification Schemes. 
 
4.2 Access Control Policy Definition 
 
At present, the access control policy is a 
centralised database containing usernames and a set of 
classification labels to which that user as access. This 
allows the owner of an information resource to 
maintain the list of users in the collaborative working 
group and modify the access controls as the working 
group develops. For example, initially they may allow 
a collaborator “Community Access” but remove the 
access after their collaboration has come to an end. 
Another user may have access to “Personal 
Information” for a limited period of time, and then 
have that access removed once they have completed 
the task for which access was required. This is based 
on the traditional approach to access control. The 
SPIDER model extends this control to information that 
has been distributed and shared with other 
collaborators making the control over information 
much more persistent and accurate from the owner’s 
perspective.  
 
4.3 Policy Enforcement 
 
Once the policy has been defined for the resource, 
it can be distributed. However, the policy embedded 
within the body of the resource can only be applied 
properly if the content remains confidential until the 
policy is applied. Previous work in the area has used 
encryption techniques to protect information until the 
relevant encryption keys are distributed to users and 
can be used to decrypt the content. SPIDER encrypts 
the entire resource illustrated in Figure 1 (with the 
exception of a URL that links to the centralised access 
control policy and a unique resource identifier) with 
the same key, reducing the overheads of key 
management. This renders the resource unreadable 
until the policy can be applied. The key is centrally 
stored in a database, along with a unique identifier for 
the resource. 
Upon requests for access, the SPIDER application 
extracts the URL link from the resource and sends an 
access request to the URL across a secure connection, 
which is actually a Web Service resident on the server 
of the information owner. The request includes the 
unique identifier for the resource and the identity 
credentials of the user. The identity details that are sent 
are previously configured in the client application. The 
Web Service forwards a query to the access control and 
key storage databases for the selected resource and 
returns a security label containing the classification 
labels to which the user has been granted access, along 
with a decryption key for the resource. The client side 
SPIDER application can then decrypt the resource in 
memory, parse the resources for the classifications 
labels that match the security label returned for the 
user, and generate a dynamic subset of the original 
resource in unencrypted form for the user to access. 
The entire policy enforcement process is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Policy Enforcement Mechanism 
 
The information is displayed to the user by the 
SPIDER application so that the user can then edit and 
add to the content. If they so wish, they can add their 
own classification labels and another URL link will be 
added to the resource so that next time a request for 
access is made, the client side application will query 
both access control policies before generating the 
unencrypted document. Once the SPIDER application 
is closed or the file is saved, the information is returned 
to encrypted form until the next access request.  
The SPIDER text editor is a basic Java editor. The 
persistent control over information relies on the editing 
of text being carried out within the proprietary editor in 
order to enforce the access control policy and restrict 
access based on the set of embedded information 
classification labels. This is very much along the same 
lines as DRM approaches. The SPIDER project 
assumes that to maintain control in distributed 
environments there must be an agent that acts on the 
behalf of the local access control policy to provide 
control over information. This follows the development 
of other DRM tools that control access to licensed 
media such as music and video. The advantage of the 
SPIDER application is that it is platform independent, 
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being developed in Java, and it can be invoked over the 
Web through the Web Start function of Java, meaning 
that a user does not necessarily need to have any 
software installed on their local machines to use the 
editor. 
 
5. Conclusions & Further Work 
 
The SPIDER project is in early stage development. 
At present, this paper presents the concept of an access 
control policy that is managed centrally and can be 
enforced on machines that are under autonomous 
control and outside of the secure network perimeter of 
the organisation that owns the information. Also, that 
information can be fragmented and protected at 
different levels depending on its protection 
requirement, with each section of content having 
modifiable access control policy allowing much more 
fine-grained, persistent control over information. The 
rationale comes from the traditional method of 
labelling paper based information resources with the 
level of restriction assigned to them. The underlying 
concepts are developed with some additional 
functionality still to be researched and developed 
during the project lifetime. 
Identity management is an area that is still under 
investigation. It is not envisaged that a simple 
username identity credential will suffice. X.509 
certificates are one option under investigation. 
Attribute certificates allow the potential to incorporate 
user identity, organisation, VO and location attributes 
and can be issued by a trusted authority to ensure a 
greater level of trust in the security of the SPIDER 
application. 
Access control policy could potentially be 
represented in an actual language. XACML or other 
standards could provide a more standard, flexible 
method for representing policy. 
Trusted computing is another area of interest. The 
decryption of the resources in memory is open to attack 
from memory hacks or leaks, and the addition of a 
trusted computing module to ensure confidentiality 
during decryption/encryption is under investigation. 
The text editor is quite basic at present with simple 
text editing capability. It is envisaged that a plug-in 
will be developed for Open Office in the future so that 
users gain full text editing functionality. The vision is 
to share files in proprietary format, translate them to 
open XML based format if necessary, apply the 
controls through SPIDER and open the document for 
editing. All actions being performed transparently to 
the user as if they were opening a normal text file. 
SPIDER research to date has focussed on the 
restriction of collaboratively developed text 
documents. However, because of the structured nature 
of the information managed by the SPIDER 
application, the approach could be extended to the 
control of other structured information such as 
databases and Web Services. Web Services in 
particular could be a very interesting target for future 
development. Web Service description documents 
(WSDLs) contain information relating the location, all 
available operations and input/output parameters for 
Web Services. The SPIDER application could be used 
to add labels to the available operations in order to 
classify and define access controls to those operations. 
For example, a particular Web Service may offer 
query, modify and delete operations for database 
access. The ability to persistently control and modify 
privileges that define who can query, who can modify 
and who can delete from the database may be 
particularly advantageous in a collaborative working 
environment. 
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